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The security of the UK’s undersea critical national infrastructure

 

COMMENTARY

By Dr Robert James Chapman

United Kingdom


Introduction

Given recent events, the project and programme management of new undersea cables and pipelines must take account of state-based armed conflict, geopolitical unrest and the disruption to critical undersea infrastructure arising from intentional physical damage. It must reflect the security and maintainability requirements of undersea infrastructure throughout the entire development project lifecycle from inception to handover, incorporating the requirements of operations, security and maintainers. The importance of disruption to critical infrastructure is reflected within the top global risks identified by the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report of 2025 issued in January. These projects therefore must consider the design, installation and protection of this infrastructure with a specific focus on the supply chain and the selection of installers. In particular they must take cognisance of the New York Joint Statement on the security and resilience of undersea pipelines and cables, issued by the 79th annual United Nations General Assembly in New York in September 2024.

Recent events

On 25 December 2024 Finland’s electricity transmission operator Fingrid reported that their 106-mile EstLink 2 cable connections between Finland and Estonia had been disconnected and possibly deliberately sabotaged. On the same day the Finnish telecommunications and digital operator Elisa reported two fibre optic cables linking Helsinki (Finland) and Tallinn (Estonia) were broken. In addition, Finnish transport and communications agency Traficom advised a fourth internet cable running between Finland and Germany and belonging to Finnish group Cinia was also believed to have been severed. Fingrid requested seizure of the Russian ‘shadow fleet’ oil tanker Eagle S over suspected cable damage. As a consequence, the Finish coastguard boarded the Eagle S oil tanker at sea and to aid their investigation, took command of and sailed the vessel to an anchorage near the Finish port of Porvoo. Sophisticated spying equipment was found on board the tanker. The Cook Islands registered ship is considered by the European Commission and Finland to be part of Russia’s so called ‘shadow fleet’.

Previous incidents

These most recent events follow on the heels of the severing of the Arelion data cable between the Swedish island of Gotland and Lithuania on November 17 2024 and the cutting of the 730-mile C-Lion telecommunications cable between Helsinki (Finland) and the port of Rostock (Germany) on November 18, 2024[i]. In a statement by the European Commission on 26 December 2024, it said “we are strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables, including enhanced information exchange, new detection technologies, as well as in undersea repair capabilities and international cooperation. We remain committed to ensuring the resilience and security of our critical infrastructure”.

Unfortunately, these events are not isolated. The sabotage of three of the four Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022 highlighted the potential vulnerability of undersea cables and pipelines to malicious attack. The Nord Stream pipelines carried gas from Russia to Rostock in Germany under the Baltic Sea and as reported by the BBC “were a controversial and unpopular symbol of European energy dependence on Moscow”. As reported by Damien McGuinness of the BBC in August last year, German state prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for a Ukrainian diving instructor.

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How to cite this work: Chapman, R. J. (2025).  The security of the UK’s undersea critical national infrastructure, commentary, PM World Journal, Vol. XIV, Issue II, February.  Available online at https://pmworldlibrary.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/pmwj149-Feb2025-Chapman-security-of-UKs-critical-undersea-infrastructure.pdf


About the Author


Dr Robert J. Chapman

United Kingdom

 

Dr Robert J Chapman, PhD, MSc., DipArch(Hons)., FAPM, CFIRM, FCIHT, FICM is the Managing Director of Dr Chapman and Associates Ltd. He is an international risk management specialist. He has provided risk management services in the UK, the Republic of Ireland, Holland, UAE, South Africa, Malaysia and Qatar on multi-billion programmes and projects across 14 different industries. He is author of the texts: ‘The SME business guide to fraud risk management’ published by Routledge, ‘Simple tools and techniques for enterprise risk management, 2nd edition’, published by John Wiley and Sons Limited, ‘The Rules of Project Risk Management, implementation guidelines for major projects, 2nd edition’ published by Routledge Publishing and ‘Retaining design team members, a risk management approach’ published by RIBA Enterprises. He holds a PhD in risk management from Reading University and has been elected a fellow of the IRM, CIHT, APM and ICM and is a former member of the RIBA. In 2007 Andrew Bragg (APM Chief Executive at the time) formally confirmed he has exceptional risk management skills. Robert has passed the M_o_R, APM Level 1 and PMI risk examinations. He was a finalist for the 2024 FERMA European Risk Manager of the Year award and winner of the UK 2024 Risk Management Innovation of the Year award. In addition, he has provided project and risk management training in Scotland, England, Singapore and Malaysia. Robert has been an external PhD examiner.

He can be contacted at DrChapmanAssociates@outlook.com

[i] BBC (2024) “Germany suspects sabotage behind severed undersea cables”, Henri Astier & Paul Kirby. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9dl4vxw501o