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The Critical Need for Product-Focused Incentives

 

in U.S. Federal Contracting

 

FEATURED PAPER

By Carrie Tinker

Oklahoma, USA


Abstract

The current U.S. federal procurement system faces persistent challenges that undermine its effectiveness in delivering high-quality products and services to government agencies. Recent acquisition failures and GAO reports further underscore the urgent need for reform to modernize federal procurement for 21st-century challenges.

This essay examines systemic failures within the existing Earned Value Management (EVM) framework and — through analysis of empirical evidence, regulatory frameworks, and acquisition outcomes — demonstrates how a product-focused incentive model would fundamentally realign contractor incentives with mission objectives.

The transition from process-centered to outcome-oriented contracting is not merely an incremental improvement, but a necessary paradigm shift to enhance innovation, reduce administrative waste, improve mission outcomes, and provide greater value to taxpayers.

Although this is primarily U.S. federal procurement and program management focused, the content and proposed resolutions can apply to contracting and program management worldwide.

Introduction: The Crisis in U.S. Federal Procurement

The U.S. federal government spends approximately $650 billion annually on contracts for goods and services, representing roughly 15% of all federal spending.

Despite this massive investment, the current procurement system consistently delivers suboptimal results. Major defense acquisitions routinely exceed budgets by 20-50%, experience multi-year delays, and still fail to meet performance requirements when finally delivered.

A 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that 53% of major defense acquisition programs experienced cost overruns exceeding 25% of their original estimates, while 73% reported schedule delays averaging 29 months. More troublingly, even after these cost increases and delays, 42% of delivered systems failed to meet critical performance metrics when deployed. Further concerning is the reliability of program milestones which are presumed to prevent system failures but instead appear to contribute to the delivered system failures. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, originally estimated at $233 billion, has seen costs balloon to over $400 billion while delivering aircraft with significant operational limitations.

These failures are not isolated to defense procurement. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ Electronic Health Record Modernization project, initially budgeted at $10 billion, has faced significant delays, cost overruns exceeding $5.5 billion, and numerous operational issues during implementation. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security’s Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) was canceled after $1 billion in expenditures delivered systems that met technical specifications but failed to achieve operational objectives.

The start of any reform is questioning the logic and system which facilitates the failed outcomes. The examples cause one to ask basic questions, “were the incentivized milestones realistically, conceptually, and legitimately achieved? Can the system and measurements be manipulated? Why did the incentivized performance proven system fail these programs and others? What is the performance driven profit incentive logically aligned with on these programs? What is the root cause leading to the U.S. procurement system’s failure when the same system has been proven successful around the world? Is the government rewarding the wrong objective?”

This abstract intends to objectively and logically address these questions with a proposed improvement model for the U.S. government procurement system which incentivizes both performance and product success.

The examples highlight a fundamental disconnect in the current procurement system: compliance with process metrics often supersedes actual mission outcomes.

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To read entire paper, click here

How to cite this paper: Tinker, C. (2025). The Critical Need for Product-Focused Incentives in U.S. Federal Contracting; PM World Journal, Vol. XIV, Issue V, May, Available online at https://pmworldlibrary.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/pmwj152-May2025-Tinker-Critical-Need-for-Product-Focused-Incentives.pdf


About the Author


Carrie Tinker

Oklahoma, USA

 

Carrie Tinker is a dedicated wife of 23 years and mother of 6 wonderful children.  She served in the USAF reserves, on active duty, and as a dependent of an active duty service member for over 20 years.  She served her local community as a uniformed police officer for over 14 years and earned a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice. She also served as insurance claims adjuster, computer technician, air transportation specialist, logistician, program manager, trainer, mentor, and manager.  She taught police defensive tactics and flight or flight misconceptions to law enforcement and local communities.

She loves reading and solving complex puzzles.  She strives personally and professionally to expand her knowledge in history, economics, resources, supply chain, politics, military strategy, engineering, data modeling, technology, finance, and how they all intersect and interlink together.  She encourages others, especially her children, to learn and investigate the world around them because it’s full of fascinating miracles everywhere. Her personal hobbies include: spending time with family and close friends, volunteering with local animal rescues, DYI activities, traveling, art projects, gardening, sports activities, and home improvements.  Currently, she is pursuing a Master’s in Business Administration degree for Executive Leadership in the Aerospace and Defense industry.

Carrie Tinker can be contacted at carrietinker@yahoo.com